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On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Fordham 
Intellectual Property Law & Policy Conference, its organizer, 
Professor Hugh Hansen, planned a session on “U.S. Copyright 
Law: Where Has It Been? Where Is It Going?” and asked me to 
look back over the twenty years since the conference’s inception in 
order to identify the most important development in copyright 
during that period.  Of course, the obvious answer is “the 
Internet,” or “digital media,” whose effect on copyright law has 
been pervasive.  I want to propose a less obvious response, but 
first acknowledge that digital media and communications have 
presented significant challenges to every one of the exclusive 
rights that § 106 of the Copyright Act grants to authors.  Part I 
will summarize those challenges, as well as the addition of a new § 
106 right, and of new “paracopyright”1 rights regarding 
technological protection measures and copyright management 
information.  Digital media have also considerably broadened the 
scope of fair use and have prompted the introduction of 
commercially significant immunities for intermediary service 
providers.  Part II will address the expansion of copyright defenses 
and immunities and will suggest that, contrary to the popular 
depiction of overreaching copyright rights and remedies, the 
courts have re-balanced copyright to weight toward users.  
Finally, turning from digital media, I will offer a less obvious 
response, one that I hope evokes the core of copyright law, past, 
present and future. 
 
 1  See, e.g., David Nimmer, Puzzles of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 46 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 401, 405 (1998). 
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I. EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS, MODIFIED BY DIGITAL MEDIA? 
A. Section 106 rights 
Over the last twenty years, the growth of digital media has 
obliged courts to reconsider the basic statutory concepts of 
fixation, transfer, reproduction and public performance and 
display.  The perils, and promise, of digital exploitations have also 
prompted Congress to create a new exclusive right, to control 
access to works of authorship through imposition of technological 
protection measures. 
1. Right to reproduce the work in copies 
With respect to the first of the § 106 rights, the exclusive right 
to reproduce the work in copies, case law has addressed the basic 
issues of “what is a copy?” and “who makes the copy?”2  The first 
question concerns the vexed issue of “RAM copying”—is the 
temporary digital copy of a program that resides on a computer’s 
random access memory considered “fixed,” even though the copy 
remains more or less briefly in the RAM and is lost when the 
computer is shut down?  Is there a difference between a copy 
temporarily resident in RAM (which could remain there for days 
until the user turns the computer off), and a copy transiting through 
a computer network?  Both types of a copy appear to meet the 
statutory prerequisite of capacity to be “perceived, reproduced or 
otherwise communicated . . . with the aid of a machine or device.”3  
But the statute also requires that this capacity endure for “a period 
of more than transitory duration.”4  The 1976 House Report states 
that “transient reproductions . . . captured momentarily in the 
‘memory’ of a computer’ should not be deemed fixed.”5  It is not 
clear how fleeting Congress expected a “transient reproduction” to 
be.  The subsequent report of the congressionally created 
 
 2  Compare Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121 
(2d Cir. 2008) (holding cable company was not directly liable under the Copyright Act 
because copies were “made” by its customers), with MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 
Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding copying under copyright law includes transfer 
from permanent storage device to a computer’s RAM). 
 3  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).  
 4  Id. § 101. 
 5  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666. 
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Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 
(CONTU) led to a 1980 amendment of § 117 of the Copyright Act 
exempting a temporary reproduction of a computer program that is 
made simply by turning on the computer (§ 117(a)(1)) and a 
further amendment of that section in 1998 to the same effect (§ 
117(c)).6  This legislation appears to adopt the principle, expressed 
in the CONTU report, that entry of a work into the memory of a 
computer makes a “copy” of the work, apparently without 
distinction as to the duration of the copy.7  Congress’s provision of 
narrow exemptions for RAM copying in § 117 of the Copyright 
Act points toward a congressional understanding that such copying 
would otherwise be infringing under § 106.8  
But neither CONTU nor the § 117 amendments explicitly 
addressed especially evanescent reproductions in transit from one 
computer to another.  Is there a point at which a reproduction is too 
fleeting to be a “copy” within the scope of the exclusive right of 
reproduction?  The Second Circuit, in Cartoon Network v. CSC 
Holdings,9 emphasizing what it called the “duration requirement” 
in the definition of “fixed,” held that reproductions made in a 
computer’s “buffer” and lasting 1.2 seconds, were insufficiently 
“fixed” to be “copies.”  The ruling may be in some tension with 
decisions from other circuits and a study by the Copyright Office 
interpreting the reproduction right to encompass a broad temporal 
range of “RAM copies.”10  The court distinguished the case law 
 
 6 These amendments accorded exemptions for such copying when unauthorized if for 
the expected use of purchased programs or in connection with the “maintenance or 
repair” of the computer.  Section 117(c) responds to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in MAI 
Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d 511, which had found a repair service’s creation of a temporary 
copy to infringe.  
 7 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED 
WORKS, FINAL REPORT 22 (1978). 
 8  But see R. Anthony Reese, The Public Display Right: The Copyright Act’s 
Neglected Solution to the Controversy Over RAM “Copies,” 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 145 
(2001) (contending that applying reproduction analysis to RAM copying disputes creates 
an overbroad “RAM copy doctrine” that “may allow a copyright owner not only to use 
copyright to control activities by third parties . . . that would not otherwise infringe, but . . 
. may allow copyright owners . . . to control other people’s access to, and use of, 
noncopyrightable elements contained in a copyrighted work”).  
 9 536 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 10 See, e.g., Stenograph LLC v. Bossard Assocs., 144 F.3d 96, 101–02 (D.C. Cir. 
1998); MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d 511; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 
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authorities for failure to explicitly address the duration 
requirement.  It also criticized the Copyright Office Report, which 
had confronted the duration issue, but had reached a different 
conclusion: “According to the Copyright Office, if the work is 
capable of being copied from that medium for any amount of time, 
the answer to both questions [embodiment and duration] is ‘yes.’ 
The problem with this interpretation is that it reads the ‘transitory 
duration’ language out of the statute.”11  Inquiring, therefore, 
“[d]oes any such embodiment [in Cablevision’s buffer] last ‘for a 
period of more than transitory duration’?” the court answered no.12  
While ruling that 1.2 seconds were not “more than transitory,” the 
court did not indicate what period of embodiment would suffice, 
although it did imply that “at least several minutes” would meet 
the duration requirement.13  Nor did the court suggest how to 
characterize durations falling between those two limits.14 
As for who makes the copy, the Second Circuit, imposing a 
controversial “volition” condition, ruled that the entrepreneur of an 
automated system that copies, stores, and plays back television 
programming to subscribers at the subscribers’ demand, did not 
“make” those copies because the system simply responded to the 
end-user’s choice of programming to copy.  It is not clear, 
 
REPORT 107–23 (2001) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT], available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf.  Of these 
authorities, however, only the Copyright Office Report specifically addresses 
reproductions as transient as “buffer copies.”  The Ninth and D.C. Circuit decisions 
involved software loaded into RAM and apparently retained for some minutes. But see 
MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 938–39 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding 
as licensees, not owners, of game software, players may infringe when their computers 
temporarily copy software into RAM). 
 11 Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 129. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 128. 
 14 Id.; see also License for Making and Distributing Phonorecords, Including Digital 
Phonorecord Deliveries, 73 Fed. Reg. 66,173, 66,177 (proposed Nov. 7, 2008) (to be 
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201 and 255) (“The [Cablevision] court’s reasoning leaves at 
least something to be desired and offers no guidance as to when a copy might be 
considered to be ‘embodied’ for ‘a period of more than transitory duration.’ . . . Indeed, it 
leaves open the possibility that a buffer copy that exists for several seconds might have 
sufficient duration to satisfy the fixation requirement.  We can glean no principle from 
the Second Circuit’s opinion which offers any guidance as to where the line is to be 
drawn.”). 
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however, that volition must always be a distinct element of the 
violation of the reproduction right.  The court’s principal authority 
for a volition requirement, Religious Technology Center v. Netcom 
On-Line Communications Services,15 a Northern District of 
California decision from the first years of the twenty-year period 
here surveyed, concerned a “mere conduit” online service provider, 
who simply conveyed copies of works from one subscriber to 
another.16  By contrast, Cablevision’s own transmissions were the 
source of the copies the subscribers requested.  Moreover, while 
Cablevision did not select the particular program designated by the 
user, the user made her selection from a universe proposed by 
Cablevision, and Cablevision stored the selected programs. 
One suspects that underlying the court’s determination that 
Cablevision did not “make” the copies it stored for users at their 
request, was an unstated conclusion regarding an issue the parties 
agreed not to litigate: whether the end users would be liable for 
copying the television programming.  The court seems to have 
considered the subscribers’ activities as a higher-tech form of 
“time shifting;” under the Supreme Court’s Sony decision,17 time 
shifting (at least of free broadcast television)18 is non-infringing, 
thus the higher-tech version must be non-infringing, too.  That 
calculus may have informed the court’s assessment of “who” made 
the copy.  Suppose instead, however, that Cablevision had been 
offering its customers access to programming that the customers 
were not otherwise entitled to view, for example because those 
customers formed an audience to which Cablevision’s cable or 
satellite distribution compulsory license did not extend.19  One may 
 
 15 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 16 Congress in 1998 codified much of the Netcom results with respect to online service 
providers in § 512 of the Copyright Act. 
 17 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454–55 (1984). 
 18 Cablevision customers were time shifting cable transmissions, which fall outside the 
stated scope of Sony. 
 19 See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 111, 119, 122 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  Sections 111 and 119 
differentiate between local broadcasts and distant broadcasts.  Local broadcasts are those 
that can reach viewers in the area where the cable system or satellite is located without 
the use of a cable system or satellite, and distant broadcasts are those that viewers would 
not otherwise receive without the cable system or satellite because they are imported 
from distant broadcast stations.  Cable systems or satellites can retransmit local 
broadcasts without having to pay copyright license fees, but §§ 111 and 119 establish a 
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wonder whether, in this version, the court still would have found 
that Cablevision lacked sufficient agency to be the “maker” of 
those storage copies. 
The court may have assumed that it ultimately will not matter 
who “makes” the copy if the business that “induced” the end-user 
to make the copy would in any event be liable as a contributory 
infringer20 (an issue the parties agreed not to litigate).  But if the 
end-user’s copy is not infringing, there will be no secondary 
liability.  Arguably, if the end-user’s copying would be fair use, 
then assisting that copying should not be infringing either, whether 
the assistance comes in the form of enabling the end-user to do the 
copying herself, or instead doing the copying for the user.  But the 
case law is far from clear that copying on behalf of the user is fair 
use.21  Given the proliferation of increasingly automated “on 
demand” services, to designate as the de jure “copyist” the 
beneficiary of the copy that the service offered to make on the 
user’s behalf risks putting significant amounts of economic activity 
beyond the reach of the copyright law (and spawning new business 
models designed to exploit this newly-introduced gap in the law).22 
 
compulsory license scheme for distant broadcasts.  Section 119 defines the households 
and subscribers eligible to receive secondary transmissions from the satellite carrier, and 
sets out “violation[s] of territorial restrictions on statutory license for network stations.”  
Section 122 allows a satellite carrier to make secondary transmissions into the television 
station’s local market, subject to a compulsory license.  Pursuant to § 122(f), the satellite 
carrier may not transmit the performance or display to a subscriber who does not reside in 
the originating television station’s local market. 
 20 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 923, 
937–40 (2005) (finding that the users of defendants’ file-sharing software downloaded 
copyright files, but defendants were liable for contributory infringement because they 
induced infringement); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014, 1022 
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that Napster’s users violated plaintiffs’ right of reproduction, but 
Napster was liable as a contributory infringer because it supplied the means of copying 
and had specific knowledge of what works were being copied).   
 21 See generally Joseph P. Liu, Enabling Copyright Consumers, 22 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1099, 1099–1100 (2007) (“[C]ourts quite frequently hold companies liable for 
helping consumers engage in activities that would be fair or non-infringing uses if 
undertaken by consumers themselves.”). 
 22 See, e.g., Disney Enters., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (S.D. Fla. 
2011) (dismissing count of direct copyright infringement by file-sharing service for 
failure to plead volitional conduct); Fox Broadcasting Co. v. Dish Network LLC, 2012 
US Dist LEXIS 169112 (C.D. Cal. 2012).  Other courts have not found the Second 
Circuit’s volition prerequisite persuasive. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. WTV 
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2. Derivative works right 
The meaning of “derivative works” covered by § 106(2) came 
into question in cases testing the scope of the definition “any form 
in which the work may be recast, transformed or adapted.”  Is a 
complementary product, designed to intervene in the experience of 
watching a movie or playing a videogame, for example by altering 
the game’s speed, or by deleting salacious scenes from the film, a 
“derivative work” if the product does not memorialize the changes 
in some fixed form?  Case law is unclear,23 and Congress in the 
Family Movie Act of 200524 provided a specific exemption for 
wholesome-izing software, while avoiding a determination of 
whether that software’s sanitized output would have been a 
“derivative work.” 
3. Distribution right 
The third exclusive right under § 106, to distribute copies of 
the work “to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or 
by rental, lease or lending” has given rise to several inquiries in the 
digital context.  First, does “by sale or other transfer of ownership” 
limit the kinds of distribution that come within the scope of the 
right, so that the right covers only transfer of physical copies?  
Because one who sends a digital file retains ownership of her 
source copy, if “transfer of ownership” implies divestiture, then 
only hardcopy formats are susceptible to such transfers.  A transfer 
of ownership of an analog copy implicitly involves the transferor’s 
divestiture of her copy so that the transferee may take possession.  
A book sold by a bookstore leaves the store with the customer; 
there is one fewer copy in the store’s inventory.  With digital 
 
Sys., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1011 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Fox Television Stations Inc. v. 
BarryDriller Content System PC, 2012 US Dist LEXIS 184209 (C.D. Cal. 2012).  For 
more detailed criticism of Cartoon Network v. Cablevision, see Jane C. Ginsburg, Recent 
Developments in U.S. Copyright—Part II, Caselaw: Exclusive Rights on the Ebb?, 218 
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 167 (January 2009), available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/columbia/pllt/papers/ 08158. 
 23 Compare Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998), 
with Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
 24 Family Movie Act of 2005, 17 U.S.C. § 110(11) (2006) (exempting certain 
bowdlerizing technologies). 
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copies, by contrast, one typically “sends” a copy, but retains one’s 
“original” or “own” copy in one’s computer memory.  There is no 
divestiture; rather at least two people now own copies where 
before there was only one owner.  Under these circumstances, is 
there a “transfer of ownership”? 
In London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe,25 the district court 
focused on the creation of a new copy in the computer of the 
recipient, a copy which the recipient now owns: “What matters in 
the marketplace is not whether a material object ‘changes hands,’ 
but whether, when the transaction is completed, the distributee has 
a material object.”26  The concept of “transfer” in the digital world 
does not imply the disappearance of the transferor’s copy, yet the 
term appears as a matter of course.  For example the phrase “file 
transfer” (as in “file transfer protocol” or “FTP”) is widely used to 
denote sending a digital file without necessarily (or ever) deleting 
the file from the sender’s computer.27  Moreover, on further 
examination, a “distribution” need not always result in a loss of 
possession, even in the analog world.  For one very old 
technological example, consider the biblical loaves and fishes.  
English versions of the gospels recount that Jesus ordered his 
disciples to “distribute” the loaves and fishes to the public.  
Though the supply seemed inadequate, all the public were served, 
yet at the end, the same number of loaves and fishes remained in 
the baskets as at the outset.28 
 
 25 542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008). 
 26 Id. at 175.  Taken out of context, the court’s end-up-with-a-copy test could be 
overbroad.  For example, if a home viewer records a television broadcast, thus creating a 
copy, has the broadcaster “distributed” the “copy” the viewer ended up with?  Indeed, 
with contemporary recording media, any performance or display could result in “copies,” 
though, as a matter of common sense, it is doubtful that many of them would constitute 
“distributions.”  For example, if passers-by photograph the wearer of a t-shirt emblazoned 
with copyrightable text or image, copies will result, but the wearer cannot reasonably be 
said to have distributed them.  For a distribution to take place, the exchange (or new 
creation) of a copy should be the object of the transaction. 
 27 Other common uses of “transfer” that do not imply divestiture include Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol (HTTP), and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). See Margaret 
Rouse, What Is File Transfer Protocol?, SEARCHENTERPRISEWAN.COM (Apr. 2007), 
http://searchenterprisewan.techtarget.com/definition/File-Transfer-Protocol.     
 28 John 6:11 (King James).  For another bread-related example of a distribution which 
does not require the donor to part with her possession, a baker can parcel out to other 
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Legislation enacted during our twenty-year review period 
endorses the characterization of a transfer of a digital file as a form 
of “distribution.”  In 1995, Congress amended the § 115 
“compulsory license for making and distributing phonorecords” to 
include among the beneficiaries of the license “those who make 
phonorecords or digital phonorecord deliveries,” and further 
specifying, “[a] person may obtain a compulsory license only if his 
or her primary purpose in making phonorecords is to distribute 
them to the public for private use, including by means of a digital 
phonorecord delivery.”29  The definition of “digital phonorecord 
delivery” confirms that the constitution of the copy in the 
recipient’s computer is the key activity: “A ‘digital phonorecord 
delivery’ is each individual delivery of a phonorecord by digital 
transmission of a sound recording which results in a specifically 
identifiable reproduction by or for any transmission recipient of a 
phonorecord of that sound recording . . . .”30  It is reasonable to 
assume that by 1995 Congress was aware that digital deliveries 
create new copies without divesting the sender’s copy; if Congress 
nonetheless equated “digital phonorecord delivery” with 
distribution, then “transfer of ownership” cannot, at least with 
respect to the distribution rights in musical works and sound 
recordings, have been understood to require dispossession of the 
transferor’s copy.31 
But other problems remain, particularly concerning the 
compliance of the U.S. with the internationally-mandated “making 
available right.”32  The U.S. ratified the 1996 WIPO Treaties 
without providing explicitly for a “making available” right because 
it took the position that current U.S. law covered the substance of 
the right through a combination of the distribution and public 
 
bakers batches of sourdough “starter” yet retain an amount sufficient to prepare her own 
loaves. 
 29 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2006), amended by Digital Performance Right in Sound 
Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336. 
 30 17 U.S.C. § 115(d) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 31 See S. REP. NO. 104-128 at 17 (1995) (legislative history of 1995 Act, adverting to 
uncertainty whether a “transmission can constitute a distribution of copies” and 
“express[ing] no [general] view on current law in this regard” but wanting to remove 
uncertainty “as to digital transmissions of recorded music”). 
 32 See WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 6, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17. 
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performance rights.33  Some U.S. courts have nonetheless held that 
merely offering a file via a website or filesharing network does not 
“distribute” the work because “distribution” requires actual 
receipt.34  So far the case law, all from district courts, has provided 
inconsistent responses.  While early decisions generally considered 
(without extended analysis) that making a work available for end-
user access and copying “distributed” copies of the work,35 later 
rulings are more tormented.  Some require a showing of actual 
receipt, but disagree whether the court may presume receipt if the 
making available has set in motion all the other elements of 
distribution.36  At least one other court, emphasizing the definition 
of “publication,” which covers both distribution of copies and the 
offering to distribute copies, has concluded that making copies 
available for download is akin to offering to distribute, which 
constitutes a “publication,” which is synonymous with 
distribution.37  Although Congress in 2005 amended the criminal 
provisions of the Copyright Act to cover “the distribution of a 
work being prepared for commercial distribution, by making it 
available on a computer network accessible to members of the 
 
 33  See, e.g., MIHÁLY FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET 502–04 
(2002). 
 34  See Capitol Records v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1218–19 (D. Minn. 2008). 
Contra Elektra Entm’t Grp. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234, 241–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(equating distribution with publication and holding that an offer is sufficient). 
 35 See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 
1997); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
 36  Compare London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 169 (D. Mass. 
2008) (holding that “a reasonable fact-finder may infer that the distribution actually took 
place”) with Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1218–19 (D. Minn. 
2008) (holding that “actual dissemination” is required). 
 37 See Elektra, 551 F. Supp. 2d at 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  For an extensive discussion of 
the distribution right and its application to digital media, see Peter S. Menell, In Search of 
Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet Age, 59 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1 (2012). 
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public,”38 courts have yet to interpret this amendment as a general 
equation of the distribution and making available rights.39 
4. Right to perform the work “publicly” 
Difficulties proliferate in connection with the fourth § 106 
right, to perform the work publicly.  First, while the hardcopy 
world warranted the traditional distinction between copying and 
distribution on the one hand, and public performance on the other, 
digital media blurs the boundary, leaving courts to determine when 
an online exploitation is a distribution of copies and when it is a 
public performance.  When new modes of exploitation challenge 
the familiar order, courts and litigants grope toward the most apt 
metaphor.  Hence, when ASCAP contended that sending 
downloadable ringtones and music files should be deemed public 
performances, the court characterized the download as the digital 
equivalent of buying a disc at a record store, and streaming as the 
Internet equivalent of the radio.40  While streaming would come 
within the ambit of a public performance license, if a download is 
like buying a record and taking it home to listen to, then only 
private performances would ensue from the download.41  The court 
acknowledged that there might be exploitations occupying a 
midpoint on the spectrum between streams and downloads, but 
determined that it need not yet ascertain their correct 
characterization.42 
Even were the act deemed a “performance,” to trigger § 106(4), 
it must also be “public.”  Where only one member of the public 
receives a transmission of a performance, the transmission’s 
characterization as a public pay-per-view or a private performance 
 
 38  Artists’ Rights and Theft Prevention Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218, 
220 (amending § 506(a) to criminalize “the distribution of a work being prepared for 
commercial distribution, by making it available on a computer network accessible to 
members of the public, if such person knew or should have known that the work was 
intended for commercial distribution”). 
 39 For a fuller discussion of the making available right, see David Carson, Making the 
“Making Available” Right Available, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 135 (2010). 
 40 See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 627 F.3d 64, 
74 (2d Cir. 2010).  
 41 See id. at 73; see also In re Cellco P’ship, 663 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 42 Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 627 F.3d at 75 n.10. 
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may, according to the Second Circuit, turn on whether a 
centralized source copy generates multiple transmissions to 
members of the public, or whether only one member of the public 
can receive a transmission from a single, dedicated source copy.43  
As the cost of digital storage drops, the prospects for redundant 
individually-dedicated copies increase, potentially spawning a host 
of new copyright-avoiding business models, particularly as that 
storage moves to the “cloud.”44 
5. Right of public display 
The § 106(5) right of public display encounters many of the 
same ambiguities as the public performance right, as well as an 
additional uncertainty regarding “who” engages in an online public 
display.  The Ninth Circuit has ruled that the “display” of a digital 
image emanates from the source website, even when an 
intermediary frames the image in a way that, to the viewer, appears 
to make the framer (whose advertisements also accompany the 
third-party image) the source of the display.45 
6. Digital public performance of sound recordings 
Finally, in this review of the impact of digital media on the 
exclusive rights under copyright, Congress in 1995 and again in 
1998 established a new right, of digital public performance of 
sound recordings.  The new § 106(6) regime confers a full 
exclusive right on interactive communications (such as listen on 
demand), and imposes a compulsory license for webcasting and 
other non-interactive services.  The compulsory license mandates a 
50-50 division of royalties between producers and performers 
 
 43 Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 135 (2d Cir. 2008).  
Other courts have not found the Second Circuit’s volition prerequisite persuasive. See, 
e.g., Fox Television Stations v. Barrydriller Content Sys., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184209 
(C.D. Cal. 2012) (finding public performance and taking issue with Cartoon Network); 
Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. WTV Sys., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1011 (C.D. Cal. 2011).   
 44 See, e.g., Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, 874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(following Cablevision, no infringement found because retransmission of over-the-air 
television broadcast signals not a public performance as signals are first copied and 
stored for individual users and each user receives transmission from her individualized 
copy). 
 45 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1175 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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(with 5% of the performers’ share set aside for “non featured” 
performers).  By contrast, if the full exclusive right applies, 
performers will be remunerated according to their contracts, which 
may mean that they will not in fact be compensated.46  This 
division of spoils inspires a heretical inquiry: if creators are 
guaranteed a share of the income from a compulsory license, but 
may well get nothing from the market rate right, might they be 
better off without exclusive rights in exchange for guaranteed 
remuneration? 
B. DMCA—Strengthening the hand of copyright holders? 
In addition to their impact on the interpretation of traditional 
exclusive rights set out in § 106 of the Copyright Act, digital 
media have spawned new copyright-reinforcing rights, sometimes 
referred to as “paracopyright.”47  Given the speed with which the 
Internet can be used both to reproduce near-perfect copies and 
phonorecords and to transmit them around the world, Congress 
concluded it was important to support the efforts of copyright 
owners to prevent infringement at the outset, rather than merely to 
seek judicial relief afterward.48  Of course, digital dissemination of 
copyrighted works also poses opportunities, notably in reducing 
the costs of producing hardcopies and distributing them through 
“bricks and mortar” stores.  Congress perceived that the 
development of a digital marketplace would require building 
copyright owner confidence that digital dissemination would not 
result in rampant unauthorized redistribution.49  Further, a digital 
marketplace would give rise to new business models for 
individualized on-demand delivery of copyrighted works.  
Accordingly, Congress adopted the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA) in 1998.50  Its purpose, in § 1201, is to promote 
lawful digital dissemination by ensuring that “technological 
protection measures” that copyright owners choose to apply to 
their works—such as scrambling or encrypting digital versions of 
 
 46 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(g) (2006). 
 47 See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 5. 
 48 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998); H.R. REP NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21–23 (1998). 
 49 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998); H.R. REP NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 23 (1998). 
 50 Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
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recordings, films and books—are not circumvented without proper 
authorization.  Such technological protection measures are 
intended to prevent usable copies of the copyright-protected work 
from being copied, stored or transmitted to others.  They also seek 
to safeguard the new access-based business models.51 
1. Paracopyright—Anticircumvention controls 
Section 1201(a) provides that “no person shall circumvent a 
technological protection measure that effectively controls access to 
a work” protected by copyright, and that “no person shall 
manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide or otherwise 
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or 
part thereof” that (among other things) is “primarily designed or 
produced” for the purpose of circumvention or is knowingly 
marketed for use in circumvention.  While § 1201(a) thus forbids 
circumvention of what is known as “access-protection” 
technology, § 1201(b) imposes comparable proscriptions upon 
“copy-protection” technology.  Violations of § 1201 are not 
technically infringements of copyright,52 hence the 
“paracopyright” sobriquet, but §§ 1203 and 1204 impose civil and 
criminal liability, respectively, much like that for copyright 
infringement. 
Case law has focused on two threshold issues: what are the 
works whose access controls § 1201(a) protects;53 and is the right 
to control “access” in effect a right independent of the § 106 
exclusive rights?54  That is, must there be a nexus between access 
to the work and exercise of an exclusive right under copyright, or 
does a protected access control also cover forms of exploitation or 
enjoyment of copyrighted works, such as private performances, to 
which § 106 does not extend? 
 
 51 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 1–2 (1998). 
 52 Nor is registration of copyright in the technologically-protected work a prerequisite 
to an anti-circumvention claim. See I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Berkshire Info. 
Sys., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 521, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 53 See infra text accompanying notes 55–62. 
 54 See infra text accompanying notes 63–69. 
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a) Subject matter protected 
In notorious but, happily, unsuccessful attempts to leverage the 
DMCA into protecting the “aftermarket” for spare and replacement 
parts, the producers of printers and cartridges, in one case,55 and of 
garage door openers, in the other,56 asserted that rival printer 
cartridge and door opener manufacturers had violated the DMCA’s 
prohibition on circumvention of access controls.  In both cases, the 
spare part in question would not interact with the host device 
unless the host device recognized the spare part as authorized to 
function together with the host device.  If the spare part entered the 
appropriate authentication sequence or, in the terms of a 
frequently-used metaphor, engaged in the “secret handshake” with 
the host device, then the host would be “fooled” into “thinking” 
that it was working with a component made by the same producer 
and would allow the component to perform its intended function.57  
The “secret handshake” thus made it possible for a rival printer 
cartridge to substitute for the printer producer’s own replacement 
cartridges, and for a “universal garage door opener” to open the 
remote controlled garage doors manufactured by a rival company. 
Since neither printer cartridges nor garage doors are 
copyrighted works, one might query the basis on which § 1201 
could have applied.  The plaintiffs emphasized that computer 
programs control the functioning of these devices, and computer 
programs are copyrighted works.58  The extraordinary consequence 
of the plaintiffs’ reasoning would have been that any useful object 
whose workings are controlled by computer programs can come 
within the scope of § 1201 if the object’s producer makes access to 
those programs subject to an authentication sequence.  As a policy 
matter, this result is inconceivable.  Among other things, Congress 
has persistently declined to legislate design protection, in part 
because of its inability to resolve the spare parts issue;59 Congress 
 
 55 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Controls Corp., 387 F.3d 522, 547 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 56 Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
 57 See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 530. 
 58 See id. at 546; Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1186. 
 59 The closest Congress has come is setting out a sui generis regime limited to the 
production of boat hull designs. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1302 (2006). 
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is unlikely to have sought the result of an exceptionally strong 
design protection regime through the stealthy means of the DMCA. 
Policy aside, the text of § 1201 does not require protecting 
against the circumvention of the authentication sequence that 
controls access to the copyrightable computer program that 
controls the functioning of the consumer product.  The Lexmark 
court reviewed earlier “secret handshake” cases, involving access 
to transmissions of recordings of musical works, to videogames 
and to motion pictures on DVDs.60  The court underscored that all 
of those cases involved circumvention of access to computer 
programs that were “conduit[s] to protectable expression.”61  In the 
printer cartridge case, by contrast, operating the computer program 
did not make it possible to see, hear or otherwise engage with a 
work of authorship.  Rather, “the program’s output is purely 
functional: [it] ‘controls a number of operations’ in the Lexmark 
printer.”62 
b) Nature of the access that the measure controls 
If the technological protection measure must control access to a 
non-functional copyrighted work, does the access also have to be 
related to the exercise of rights under copyright?  The court in the 
Chamberlain v. Skylink garage door opener controversy also 
declined to protect the authentication sequence against 
circumvention, but arrived at that result by addressing the purpose 
of the access that the technological measure controls.63  The court 
interpolated into § 1201 a requirement that the protection against 
circumvention of an access control be related to protection against 
infringement.64  In the court’s analysis, to the extent that an access 
control forestalls infringement, for example, by making 
unauthorized copies unplayable and therefore futile, the access 
control comes within the scope of § 1201.  But the court 
 
 60 See, e.g., RealNetworks v. Streambox, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *20–21 
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000) (one of the first decisions to find violations of technological 
protection measures, in this case both access and copy controls).  
 61 Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 547–48. 
 62 Id. at 548. 
 63 381 F.3d at 1204. 
 64 Id. 
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determined that if the uses that the access control cuts off are not 
infringing uses, then the access control is not one that § 1201 was 
designed to protect.65  While this distinction makes some sense in 
the case of garage door openers, as applied to access controls that 
are “conduits” to works of authorship, the proposition is in some 
tension with Congress’s goals in prohibiting the circumvention of 
those technological measures.  The Chamberlain court worried that 
interpreting § 1201 to create an independent violation for 
circumventing access controls (or disseminating access 
circumvention devices) would “effectively create two distinct 
copyright regimes,” one tied to the traditional rights of copyright 
owners (§ 1201(b)), and the other allowing copyright owners 
“unlimited rights to hold circumventors liable under § 1201(a) 
merely for accessing that work, even if that access enabled only 
rights that the Copyright Act grants to the public.”66 
But, as the Ninth Circuit observed in MDY Industries, LLC v. 
Blizzard Entertainment Inc., a controversy involving the online 
multi-player videogame “World of Warcraft,” there is considerable 
evidence from the text and from the legislative history that 
Congress did intend to create an additional copyright regime based 
on the control over access to digitally distributed works of 
authorship.67  The text indicates that the “access” that § 1201(a) 
protects goes beyond traditional copyright prerogatives; it 
distinguishes “access” from a “right of the copyright owner under 
this title.”  The legislative history shows that the DMCA was 
designed in part specifically to foster a variety of business models 
offering the public a diversity of levels of access, for a diversity of 
prices.  The Ninth Circuit quoted the report of the House 
Commerce Committee: 
[A]n increasing number of intellectual property 
works are being distributed using a “client-server” 
model, where the work is effectively “borrowed” by 
the user . . . . To operate in this environment, 
content providers will need both the technology to 
 
 65 Id. at 1197–1201; accord Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & 
Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 66 Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1200–01. 
 67 629 F.3d 928, 947–48 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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make new uses possible and the legal framework to 
ensure they can protect their work from piracy.68 
Thus, the “access” that § 1201(a) protects goes beyond 
traditional copyright prerogatives.  The difference in scope 
becomes apparent if one compares the consequences of protecting 
a measure controlling “access to a work” with a measure 
controlling “access to a copy of a work.”69  The latter corresponds 
to “access” in the traditional copyright sense of the right to 
distribute copies of the work; the former is the new right 
introduced in the DMCA.  In a pay-per-view scheme, viewing the 
work at home is not a public performance; circumventing an access 
protection to view the film more times than paid for does not 
violate a “right of the copyright owner.”  Legal protection of the 
access measure thus gives the copyright owner control over 
consumer activities not reached by traditional copyright rights but 
within the scope of the electronic commerce envisioned by 
Congress. 
c) Exceptions to circumvention of access controls 
Given the broad scope of § 1201’s coverage, one might inquire 
if concomitantly capacious exceptions temper the new rights.  In 
fact, § 1201 also sets out a long, disparate (and somewhat 
incoherent) list of exceptions to the prohibition on circumvention 
of access controls,70 but these are narrowly-drafted and do not 
suggest a general limiting principle from which further exceptions 
might be derived.  Instead, Congress instructed the Librarian of 
Congress, in consultation with the Register of Copyrights, to 
 
 68 Id. at 947–48 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 23 (1998)). 
 69 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 28 (1998). 
 70 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)–(j) (2006).  The § 1201(f) exception for reverse 
engineering permits the circumvention of access controls for the sole purpose of creating 
non-infringing interoperable programs.  This provision might offer a significant safety 
valve, notably because it also permits both development of devices necessary to effect the 
permitted reverse engineering, and distribution of the fruits of the permitted reverse 
engineering.  The case law construing § 1201(f) remains fairly sparse, however. See 
Davidson & Assoc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F.Supp. 2d 1164 (E.D. Mo. 2004), aff’d, 
422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005) (rejecting application of exception).  For a fuller description 
of these and other exceptions to § 1201(a), see Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation 
for the “Digital Millennium,” 23 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 137, 148–52 (1999). 
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conduct a rulemaking every three years, both to identify particular 
“classes of works” whose users would be “adversely affected by 
the prohibition . . . in their ability to make noninfringing uses 
under this title,” and to suspend the application of the prohibition 
on the act of access control circumvention as to those works until 
the next rulemaking period.71  The burden of proving the need for 
the exemption falls on the proponent, and a class identified in a 
prior rulemaking is not automatically reinstated.72  The Copyright 
Office determines whether a need for an exemption continues to be 
demonstrated.73  Note that the prohibitions against trafficking in 
access circumvention devices still apply.74 
A detailed discussion of the excepted classes is beyond the 
scope of this review,75 as is an analysis of other potential bases for 
exceptions, particularly to accommodate First Amendment 
concerns.76  For present purposes it suffices to say that while no 
court has yet entertained a First Amendment exception to § 1201,77 
the excepted classes designated by the Copyright Office have 
expanded over time, ranging from obsolete formats and devices, to 
cover certain commentary, criticism and educational uses of 
motion pictures, uses of audiovisual works and ebooks for the 
visually disabled, and, importantly, cellphones.78  One such 
exemption allows owners of cellphones to switch phone service 
networks while retaining their hardware.79  The need for this cell 
 
 71 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2006).  For a fuller discussion, see June M. Besek, Anti-
Circumvention Laws and Copyright: A Report From the Kernochan Center for Law, 
Media and the Arts, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 389, 416–23 (2004).   
 72 See Robert A. Gorman, Jane C. Ginsburg & R. Anthony Reese, COPYRIGHT: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 1106 (8th ed. 2011). 
 73 Id. at 1106–07. 
 74 Id. at 1107. 
 75 For fuller discussions, see id. at 1106–11.  The rulemakings are available on the 
Copyright Office website at http://www.copyright.gov/1201. 
 76 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, The Pros and Cons of Strengthening Intellectual 
Property Protection: Technological Protection Measures and Section 1201 of the U.S. 
Copyright Act, 16 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 191, 207–09 (2007). 
 77 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); 321 
Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004); 
United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 78 See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems 
for Access Control Technologies, 77 Fed. Reg. 65260 (Oct. 26, 2012).  
 79 See id. at 65264 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
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phone exception arose because of the arguable misuse of the anti-
circumvention protections to achieve a goal the statute was not 
designed to achieve.  Proprietors of wireless networks appear to 
have been bootstrapping access to their network service to 
protection of the technological measure that controls access to the 
software, which causes the cellphone to function in connection 
with the service.80  The second cellphone exemption covers the 
activity colloquially known as “jailbreaking,” or, in the words of 
the rulemaking, lists as a class of works “[c]omputer programs that 
enable wireless telephone handsets to execute lawfully obtained 
software applications, where circumvention is accomplished for 
the sole purpose of enabling interoperability of such applications 
with computer programs on the telephone handset.”81  Although 
the exception is phrased in general terms, it was prompted by a 
particular (mis)use of an access control: Apple’s design of the 
iPhone to prevent the running of third-party applications that 
Apple had not approved.82 
Whether the excepted classes in fact forestall misuse of access 
controls may depend on their implementation.  Because the 
exception extends to the act of circumvention, rather than to the 
provision of circumvention devices or services, arguably only the 
individual cell phone owner would be entitled to circumvent for 
the cited purposes.  Since most cellphone owners may not be 
sufficiently computer-adept, it might follow that the exception is of 
little practical application.  If, however, the offering of services 
specifically targeted to the particular exemption were deemed to 
come within the scope of the exemption, or were to benefit from a 
judge-made exception for fair circumvention,83 then the excepted 
classes might safeguard against misuse of access controls. 
 
 80 Id. In the current Rulemaking, however, the “cellphone unlocking” exception 
“applies only to mobile phones acquired prior to the effective date of the exemption or 
within 90 days thereafter” Id. at 65265. 
 81  Id. at 65263.  
 82  See id. at 65264.  
 83 See Ginsburg, supra note 76, at 207–09; Timothy K. Armstrong, Fair 
Circumvention, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
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2. Copyright Management Information 
Section 1202 of the DMCA reflects similar Congressional 
goals to enhance electronic commerce in works of authorship.  It is 
designed to encourage the copyright owner to embed important 
copyright-related information in digital copies and phonorecords, 
including the name of the author and copyright owner and the 
terms and conditions for use of the work.  Protecting this 
“copyright management information” (CMI) against removal or 
falsification should achieve the desired reliability and accuracy of 
information relevant to proper identification of works and to 
electronic (or other) transactions in rights under copyright. 
How effectively § 1202 advances this aim is debatable.  
Section 1202 prohibits knowingly providing false CMI with the 
intent to facilitate or conceal copyright infringement, as well as 
furthering the removal or alteration of CMI with reasonable 
grounds for knowing it will facilitate or conceal an infringement.84  
This double knowledge standard has proved difficult to satisfy.85  
Moreover, linking the violation of the copyright management 
information provisions to copyright infringement does not 
effectively achieve the objective of ensuring the accuracy and 
reliability of a key component of copyright management 
information—proper identification of the author (as opposed to the 
copyright holder).  Apart from the § 106A right of attribution with 
respect to works of visual art, there is no right under copyright to 
be credited as the author of a work.  This gap in § 1202’s coverage 
disserves the general public interest in knowing who is the author 
of the work.  Congress recognized the public benefit of authorship 
credit, since § 1202(c)’s definition of copyright management 
information includes “the name of, and other identifying 
information about, the author of a work.”86  Section 1202 does not 
 
 84  See, e.g., Gordon v. Nextel Commc’ns, 345 F.3d 922 (6th Cir. 2003); Schiffer 
Publ’g, Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, LLC, No. 03-4962, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9996 (E.D. 
Pa. May 25, 2005) (illustrating the difficulty of securing relief under § 1202(b)). 
 85  See, e.g., McClatchey v. Associated Press, No. 3:05-cv-145, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17768 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2007); see also BanxCorp v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 723 F. 
Supp. 2d 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Jacobsen v. Katzer, 609 F. Supp. 2d 925 (N.D. Cal. 
2009). 
 86  In addition, § 409(2) states that an application for registration of copyright “shall 
include” the name of the author. 
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oblige the rights owner to attach copyright management 
information to distributions of the work, but if the rights holder 
does attach copyright management information, then it would be 
appropriate to interpret the statute to require that the information 
include the name of the author.  Thus understood, § 1202 expresses 
a public policy favoring author identification as part of a reliable 
system of dissemination (especially electronic distribution) of 
copyrighted works, but as the judicial interpretation of § 1202 
suggests, Congress may not have drafted this provision in a way 
that sufficiently implements either authors’ interests or the more 
general interest in ensuring accurate information about a work of 
authorship. 
II. DEFENSES AND IMMUNITIES: FAIR USE AND § 512—THE 
COPYRIGHT “BALANCE” WEIGHTS TOWARD USERS 
Some years ago, with the advent of digital copyright, some 
copyright scholars (some celebrating, others dreading) anticipated 
the radical diminution of the fair use doctrine.87  On the contrary, I 
would suggest that the last twenty years have marked its 
extraordinary expansion.88  Courts now regularly give wide berth 
to “transformative” reworkings of portions of copyrighted works.89  
Moreover, where fair use of an entire work was once considered 
exceptional, and almost inconceivable if the entire work was used 
 
 87 See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Fair Use v. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights 
Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 561 (1998) 
(arguing transactions costs justification for fair use no longer applies); Raymond Ku, 
Consumers and Creative Destruction: Beyond Fair Use as Market Failure, 18 BERKELEY 
TECH L. J. 539, 545 (2003) (criticizing reduced transactions costs rationale for 
diminishing fair use); Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and 
Contract in the “Newtonian World of On-line Commerce,” 12 BERKELEY TECH L. J. 115, 
130 (1997) (positing shrinkage of fair use in light of reduction of market failure). 
 88 For a range of views on recent developments in fair use, see Symposium, Fair Use: 
“Incredibly Shrinking” or Extraordinarily Expanding?, 31 COLUM J.L. & ARTS 433 
(2008). 
 89 See generally Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use 
Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 603–06 (2008) (observing how over 80% 
of circuit court fair use opinions include a—generally dispositive—“transformativeness” 
analysis). 
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for commercial purposes,90 in the last twenty years, the concept of 
“transformative use,” which originally envisioned the creation of 
new works that build on their predecessors,91 has extended to a 
variety of commercial digital exploitations that do not produce new 
copyrightable expression.92 
In addition, as digital media increasingly enable end-users to 
engage in copyright-implicating acts, enforcement efforts have 
shifted from direct infringers to the technological entrepreneurs 
who facilitate unauthorized acts of reproduction and 
communication to the public; but judicial interpretation of 
Congress’ provisions for service provider immunity in § 512(c) of 
the Copyright Act has further re-balanced copyright to favor 
business models built (without authorization) on third-party 
copyrighted content. 
A. Fair, “Transformative” Use 
1. Transformative purposes 
In the context of the first fair use factor (the purpose and 
character of the use), Judge Leval’s seminal coinage of 
“transformative use”93 (formerly known as “productive use”94) 
predates the twenty-year period here reviewed, but the Supreme 
Court’s endorsement of the term and of Judge Leval’s analysis 
falls within our time frame.  In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
the Court inquired whether the defendants’ musical parody had 
 
 90 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449–50 
(1984). 
 91 See Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1105 (1990). 
 92 Moreover, traditional beneficiaries of fair use or other exceptions, seeking to ensure 
the transposition, and perhaps enlargement, of their privileges to the digital environment, 
have embarked on what one might call “fair use entrepreneurship” (a phrase whose 
coinage I credit to my colleague June M. Besek) through drafting of aspirational “best 
practices.” See, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF RESEARCH LIBRARIES, CODE OF BEST PRACTICES IN 
FAIR USE FOR ACADEMIC AND RESEARCH LIBRARIES (January 2012), available at 
http://www.arl.org/bm~doc/code-of-best-practices-fair-use.pdf. See generally, Patricia 
Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, RECLAIMING FAIR USE: HOW TO PUT BALANCE BACK INTO 
COPYRIGHT (2011). 
 93 See Leval, supra note 91, at 1111–12. 
 94 See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 427, 455 n.40; id. at 479–80 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
C04_GINSBURG (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2013  3:16 PM 
2013] U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 1992–2012 489 
made a “transformative” use: not one that merely supersedes the 
objects of the earlier work by copying it, but that “adds something 
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first 
with new expression, meaning, or message.”95  While the context 
of Campbell suggests that the defendant has “transformed” the 
prior work by creating a new work, courts have come to interpret 
“something new, with a further purpose” to encompass copying 
that does not add “new expression,” so long as the copying gives 
the prior work “new meaning.”96  Recent cases evidence a drift 
from “transformative work” to “transformative purpose”; in the 
latter instance, copying of an entire work, without creating a new 
work, may be excused if the court perceives a sufficient public 
benefit in the appropriation. 
In the initial shift from “transformative work” to 
“transformative purpose” the defendant had in fact created an 
independent work of authorship, even though that work did not 
significantly alter the copied work.  Thus, in Bill Graham Archives 
v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd.,97 (which did not concern digital 
technologies) the Second Circuit held “transformative” reduced-
sized complete images of posters of the legendary rock band the 
Grateful Dead by the publisher of a coffee table book biography of 
the group because the book used the images of the posters as 
“historical artifacts” to document the Dead’s concerts, rather than 
for the posters’ original aesthetic purpose.98  But the documentary-
aesthetic distinction has also significantly expanded the application 
of the fair use exception to new technological uses that do not yield 
new works.  The search engine practice of “indexing” has been the 
principal digital beneficiary of the “documentary” or “new 
 
 95 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).   
 96 See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006) (copying of photograph 
into visual collage for “an entirely different purpose and meaning” held fair use). 
 97 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 98 Even in more traditional contexts, the distinction in purpose can help ensure that the 
copyright in a work does not preclude third parties from producing a work about the 
copied work, so long as they do not copy more than needed for the documentary purpose. 
See id. at 609–10.  By contrast, courts discount the assertions of documentary purpose if 
they perceive that the defendant has reproduced the copied author’s “original expression 
for its inherent entertainment and aesthetic value.” See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. RDR 
Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (Harry Potter Lexicon “not consistently 
transformative” because it copied too much.).   
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purpose” brand of transformativeness.99  But other applications of 
the distinction are emerging.  For example, the constitution of a 
commercial database containing complete copies of copyrighted 
works may be fair use if the database does not exploit the works 
for their expressive value.100  Google has asserted that its scanning 
and retention of millions of copyrighted books is a transformative 
fair use because Google’s responses to user queries seeking 
bibliographic information or arguably fair use extracts from the 
books depend on storing full-text copies in its database.101  Twenty 
years ago, I doubt many copyright lawyers (if any) would have 
found Google’s unauthorized and commercial mass digitization a 
plausible fair use candidate.  Today even copyright traditionalists 
would acknowledge that notwithstanding its stunning boldness, the 
fair use claim is at least conceivable. 
2. Transformative markets 
The fourth fair use factor (the impact of the use upon the 
potential market for the work), is often conflated with the first 
factor; courts tend to equate “transformative” works or purposes 
with those that do not substitute for the copyright owner’s normal 
markets for the work.102  Indeed, the Second Circuit has even 
coined the term “transformative market,”103 apparently meaning an 
exploitation that falls outside the copyright owner’s zone of 
exclusivity.  The counterpoint to a “transformative market” 
 
 99 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1174–75 (9th Cir. 
2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 942 (9th Cir. 2002).  
 100 See A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(“‘iParadigms’ use of plaintiffs’ works [in a plagiarism detection database] had an 
entirely different function and purpose than the original works.”). 
 101 Defendant Google Inc.’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Its 
Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative Summary Adjudication at 27–28, 
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2012); cf. 
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, No. 11 CV 6351(HB), 2012 WL 4808939, at *11 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2012) (“The use to which the works in the HDL were put is 
transformative because the copies serve an entirely different purpose than the original 
works: the purpose is superior search capabilities rather than actual access to copyrighted 
material.”). 
 102  See, e.g., Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 619 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2009); Perfect 
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1146; Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling 
Kindersley, Ltd.,. 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 103 Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 614–15. 
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(favoring fair use) is “a traditional license market,” that is, a 
“traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed market”104 
(disfavoring fair use).  Courts inquire into whether the plaintiff is 
currently exploiting the market, or whether the market is one that 
similarly situated copyright owners would normally exploit.  The 
latter showing is important in instances where the author has 
chosen for artistic or other reasons not to develop a particular 
market.  For example, in the case of a novelist who declines to 
create or authorize a sequel,105 or of a screenwriter-television 
producer who refuses to license a trivia quiz book about the 
show,106 arguments that unauthorized entrants into those markets 
cause the creators no harm because they chose to forgo those 
derivative works markets have proven unavailing because courts so 
far have recognized both that defendants’ uses occupy traditional 
markets, and that the copyright confers the right to control the 
work’s artistic as well as its commercial destiny. 
The inquiry into “traditional license markets” also endeavors to 
avoid the charge of circularity.  Arguably, if the use is one that 
copyright owners could license, then its unlicensed exploitation 
cannot be fair use.107  By focusing on whether license markets in 
fact exist, or are in imminent prospect,108 courts seek to follow 
factor four’s direction to examine the use’s impact on the 
“potential market for the work” (emphasis supplied) without 
overstretching the realm of possible licensing opportunities.  
Recourse to the “transformative” character of the use may help 
courts identify what uses properly fall within that potential.  (Put 
another, more cynical, way, having determined that a use should 
not be ruled infringing, courts may announce that its 
“transformativeness” precludes cognizable potential market harm.) 
 
 104 Id. at 614 (quoting Am. Geophysical v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
 105 See Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F.3d 68 
(2d Cir. 2010). 
 106 See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g, Inc. 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 107 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 87. 
 108 See e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 
2001) (examining market harm from the perspective not only of file-sharing’s impact on 
established markets for sales of CDs, but also on the emerging market for licensed 
downloads). 
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3. Other developments 
The significance of new licensing markets may be greatest 
when the transformative character of the use is weakest, 
particularly when the “transformation” might better be seen as a 
new form of redistribution of the same content.  The photocopying 
decisions rendered during our twenty-year period are significant in 
this regard not only for their endorsement of new licensing markets 
but equally importantly for their recognition that the new 
technology at issue had changed the nature of the object of inquiry 
into economic harm.  Where once the relevant economic unit was 
the book or journal issue as a whole, the photocopier’s 
disaggregation of the work into separate chapters or articles,109 or 
even shorter excerpts,110 shifts the focus to smaller compensable 
units.111  This phenomenon is not confined to photocopiers or to 
literary works, as the emergence of a market for “ringtones” 
(usually twenty to thirty seconds of a recorded musical 
composition) attests.  As a result, the third factor (amount and 
substantiality of the portion taken) may blend with the fourth, as 
the “substantiality” of the copied amount may turn on its distinct 
exploitability. 
As we have seen, however, redistribution of the same content is 
no longer fatal to a fair use claim.  In addition to entertaining some 
digital redistributions’ (very) arguable “transformativeness,” courts 
have also credited the defense of implied license.112  Arguably, 
anyone who posts a website wants that website to be found on the 
Internet; to be found, one’s site has to be “indexed,” that is, copied 
and stored in the search engine’s database, as well as partly 
reproduced in search reports.  Copyright owners who do not wish 
to have their sites copied can “opt out” of being crawled by 
including an instruction to the search engine’s “robot” not to copy 
 
 109 See Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 913. 
 110 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 
1996) (en banc). 
 111 But see Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, No. 1 (N.D. Ga. 
2012) (evaluating impact on books as a whole rather than individual chapters of books in 
assessing fair use of portions of books placed on university course “electronic reserves”).  
Publisher appears not to have pleaded market harm to individual chapters. 
 112 See, e.g., Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006). 
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the site.113  Otherwise, in this fully automated process (whose 
defaults the search engine nonetheless sets), the website will be 
included.  Failure to withdraw completely from the indexing 
process (in the absence of a halfway setting allowing the “bot” to 
reproduce some but not all of the content of an open-access 
webpage) is construed as acceptance of the search engine’s 
terms.114  The more widespread the practice of implied licensing, 
the more “fair” it becomes.  While the outcome seems reasonable 
in the context of search reports, it is more problematic with respect 
to news aggregation sites (compiled by the same search engines) 
that copy headlines and full sentences from news organizations’ 
websites.  It is also troubling that fair use may be becoming 
intertwined with implied license arguments which themselves 
presume copyright owner acceptance of search engines’ 
unilaterally-imposed design choices. 
B. ISP immunity and copyright-exploiting business models 
Where end-users once merely consumed copyrighted works 
brought to them by distribution or transmission intermediaries, the 
Internet has given end-users the capacity to copy and communicate 
works themselves.  Consequently, it has also altered the role of 
intermediaries, many of whom now facilitate end-user 
communications without themselves actively intervening in the 
creation or selection of the content that they transmit.  Internet 
service providers (ISPs) that allow home computer users to 
connect to the Internet and to post and exchange all manner of 
potentially copyright-protected materials provide an appealing 
target for copyright infringement lawsuits, when the alternative 
would often be cumbersome suits against individuals.  ISPs 
accordingly have, thanks to the DMCA, largely succeeded in 
insulating themselves from most copyright liability.115  ISPs now 
enjoy liability limitations even in circumstances unanticipated by 
Congress in 1998, circumstances which have promoted copyright-
dependent, yet largely copyright-immune business models. 
 
 113 See, e.g., Googlebot, GOOGLE (June 7, 2012), http://support.google.com/ 
webmasters/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=182072. 
 114 See id. 
 115 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). 
C04_GINSBURG (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2013  3:16 PM 
494 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:465  
1. The statutory safe harbor regime 
Section 512 of the Copyright Act exempts online service and 
access providers from liability for damages for copyright 
infringement, and significantly reduces the scope of injunctive 
relief, if the providers meet the bill’s cumulative factors assessing 
the independence of the providers from the infringing content they 
transmit, host or link to.  Service providers have no general duty to 
monitor their sites, nor to seek out evidence of infringing 
activity.116  Failure to comply with § 512 does not of itself subject 
the service provider to liability for copyright infringement; § 512 
offers a safe harbor, but a nonqualifying provider must still be 
proved to have infringed, and may still invoke traditional copyright 
and other defenses. 
A thorough review of the § 512 case law exceeds the scope of 
this summary; I will focus on judicial interpretation of the criteria 
for limiting the liability of hosts of third-party content residing on 
systems or networks at the direction of users (§ 512(c)).  Section 
512(c) sets forth cumulative prerequisites to a hosting service 
provider’s qualification for exemption from direct or vicarious 
liability for copyright infringement.  First, the host must be a 
“service provider.”  Section 512’s definition of “service provider” 
is exceedingly vague; the term “means a provider of online 
services or network access or the operator of facilities therefor.”  
“Online services” are not defined, but the case law has generally 
interpreted “service provider” broadly, to cover not only Internet-
specific businesses, but a variety of traditional businesses’ Internet 
operations as well.117 
Second, § 512(c) absolves a host service provider from liability 
“for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the 
direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network 
controlled or operated by or for the service provider.”  At first 
blush, it might appear that § 512 does not suspend liability for 
other acts in which the service provider might engage 
 
 116 Id. § 512(m). 
 117 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1175 
(C.D. Cal. 2002) (assuming defendant qualified as a service provider, but admitting that it 
“has found no discussion [in prior case law] of this definition’s limits”). 
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independently of, or even with respect to, third-party-posted 
content.  But, as the Ninth Circuit has stressed, § 512 assumes that 
users will be able to access content posted to host websites.118  
Thus, the websites must be permitted to transmit the stored content 
to the requesting user; to limit § 512(c) to the sole act of storage 
would effectively nullify the safe harbor.119  To the extent the 
storage-plus activity is not closely related to the storage, the 
service provider would lose the safe harbor only with respect to the 
activities that exceeded the bounds of “‘storage’ and allied 
functions”; any excess would not disqualify those activities that 
came within those bounds.120 
Third, a host provider must “not have actual knowledge that 
the material or an activity using the material on the system or 
network is infringing”121 and it must not be “aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent”;122 this is 
sometimes referred to as the “red flag” standard.123  Once the host 
becomes “aware” of infringing activity, it must act “expeditiously 
to remove, or disable access to, the material.”124  Most importantly, 
in the absence of prior awareness, but upon proper notification by 
the copyright owner, the service provider must respond 
“expeditiously to remove, or disable access to” the allegedly 
infringing material.125  Accordingly, § 512(c)(2) requires that a 
service provider, in order to benefit from the reduction in liability, 
designate, and provide contact information concerning, an agent to 
receive notification of claimed infringements.126  Under § 512, the 
qualifying service provider incurs no general burden of 
 
 118 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1033 
(9th Cir. 2011).   
 119 See id. 
 120 See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), 
aff’d, 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 121 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
 122 Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
 123 See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012); Shelter 
Capital, 667 F.3d at 1038; Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
 124 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2006). 
 125 Id. § 512(c)(1)(C). 
 126 Id. § 512(c)(2). 
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anticipating or preventing infringement; it need only react to 
notices of infringement that the copyright holders uncover. 
2. Practical implications of the safe harbor regime 
In practice, § 512(c)’s notice and take-down system may not 
adequately address the hydra-like reappearance of noticed content.  
Because other users may promptly re-post content the notified 
service provider takes down, the question arises at what point, if 
any, the service provider becomes disqualifyingly “aware” that the 
contested content is making repeat appearances, so that some 
obligation to forestall specific infringements may attach.  So far, 
the case law interpreting the statutory “red flag” standard suggests 
the flag may need to be an immense crimson banner before any 
service provider obligation to intervene of its own accord comes 
into play.127  General knowledge that the service’s users are 
posting infringing content does not suffice to shift the burden of 
investigation; indeed, courts have held that if any investigation is 
required to ascertain a particular infringement, then the service has 
no duty to intervene.128  Rather, as the Second Circuit held in 
Viacom v. YouTube, knowledge of specific infringements is 
required: the “red flag” waves only if “the provider was 
subjectively aware of facts that would have made the specific 
infringement ‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable person.”129  
Although the point is debatable, it has been held that even repeated 
take-down notices identifying the same specific unauthorized 
content do not give rise to sufficient awareness.130  It appears from 
Viacom and other decisions that if the service provider must of its 
own accord remove infringing content, it must know, without 
investigation, not only what the particular content is, but where it 
is to be found on the website. 
Lest this standard seem exceedingly forgiving, the Viacom 
court tempered it by interpreting § 512(c) to accommodate 
common law principles of “willful blindness,” and thus to attribute 
 
 127 See, e.g., Viacom, 676 F.3d at 32; Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1114. 
 128 See Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1114. 
 129 676 F.3d at 31. 
 130 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108 
(C.D. Cal. 2009). 
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actual knowledge to the person or entity who consciously avoids 
confirming the existence of blatant infringements.131  While the 
Court of Appeals acknowledged that willful blindness must be 
assessed in light of the statute’s rejection of an affirmative duty to 
monitor one’s site, it held that the district court should have 
considered whether YouTube was willfully blind to infringements 
of which it should have known, and directed the district court to 
address this issue on remand.132 
Even allowing for some enlargement of the “red flag” standard 
through the doctrine of willful blindness, the threshold of 
awareness remains sufficiently high to foster new business models 
built on third-party copyrights from which the entrepreneur 
maintains the statutory degree of attenuation.  While Congress in § 
512(c) clearly intended to encourage new Internet intermediary 
businesses by removing the disincentive of prospective liability, it 
also sought to facilitate copyright enforcement through expeditious 
and effective take-down of infringing content.  Perhaps the text 
Congress enacted resists a construction that takes account of the 
intervening technological developments that have set the original 
balance askew, or perhaps judicial interpretation has emphasized 
solicitude for copyright intermediaries at the cost of copyright 
owners.  Either way, judicial application of § 512(c), together with 
the expansion of technological fair use and the sometimes cramped 
interpretation of the § 106 exclusive rights, further illustrates the 
evolution of copyright doctrine toward what, just before our 
twenty-year period, Ray Patterson and Stanley Lindberg 
presciently dubbed “a law of users’ rights.”133 
III. CONCLUSION: A DIFFERENT DEVELOPMENT . . . 
With creators in mind, I turn to the promised less-obvious 
development in the last twenty years of U.S. copyright.  My 
candidate for the most important copyright development is Harry 
Potter.  J.K. Rowling is, after all, the poster child for copyright, 
 
 131  See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 35.   
 132  Id. 
 133  L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW 
OF USERS’ RIGHTS (1991). 
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having gone from public assistance to riches surpassing the Queen 
of England, all on the fruits of her intellectual labor.134  Her 
success reassures us of the centrality of individual creativity in the 
copyright scheme.  She has, moreover, managed to retain a 
remarkable degree of artistic and financial control over her works, 
from film rights to ebooks.  Harry Potter is also an international 
phenomenon, widely translated, distributed—and infringed, 
whether by “Tanya Grotter,” a Russian emulation condemned by 
the Dutch courts, or “Harry Potter in Calcutta” ruled an 
infringement in India.135 
Harry Potter also affords a useful vehicle to examine 
limitations on copyright, both de jure, in the form of the fair use 
doctrine, and de facto, via the Internet.  The Harry Potter Lexicon 
sparked an interesting debate about the doctrinal differences 
between the non-commercial online version, which J.K. Rowling 
had praised, and the commercially published book, which she 
sought to have enjoined.136  In the transition from web format to 
print, the Lexicon lost the crossreferential and interactive features 
that had enhanced its claim to fair use.  In print, as Rowling’s 
lawyer put it, the author and publisher “took too much and did too 
little.”137  It had become a cut-and-paste job lacking 
“transformative” commentary or analysis, and potentially 
competed with Rowling’s own revision of her works into reference 
volumes.  By contrast, Rowling does not pursue the myriad 
acolytes who post on the web vast numbers of “fan fiction” 
variants on the Harry Potter books. The 
“HarryPotterFanfiction.com” site alone boasts almost 36,000 
 
 134 See The Wealthiest Women, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Apr. 29, 2012 at 74 
(estimating Rowling’s wealth at £560 million and the Queen’s at £310 million); see also 
Robert P. Merges, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 133–35 (2011). 
 135 See Tim Wu, Harry Potter and the International Order of Copyright, SLATE 
MAGAZINE (June 27, 2003, 12:42 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
jurisprudence/2003/06/harry_potter_and_ the_international_order_of_copyright.html.  
 136 See Warner Bros. Entm’t v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 517, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
 137 See Elyssa A.L. Spitzer, Lawyer Curses Potter Copyright Crimes, HARVARD 
CRIMSON, Nov. 7, 2008, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2008/11/7/lawyer-curses-
potter-copyright-crimes-the. 
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authors of over 78,000 Harry Potter stories.138  Were these (or 
some of them) commercialized as sequels, an infringement action 
might well follow; as webposts, they constitute one of the most 
significant examples of what my colleague Tim Wu has called 
“tolerated use,” that is, uses which may be pervasive yet pass 
under the radar of copyright enforcement, in part because their 
financial or artistic impact may be trivial, and in part because 
authors do not wish to antagonize their fan base.139 
The Harry Potter books also provide a tantalizing glimpse of 
author-managed exploitation.  Rowling kept her ebook rights, and 
released the Potter books as ebooks only in March 2012.140  They 
are compatible with all ebook readers, but available only from 
Rowling’s own “Pottermore” website.  Or, available illegitimately, 
since within less than nine days the books could be obtained from 
the Pirate Bay and other unlawful sources.141 
Of course, when it comes to controlling one’s literary or artistic 
property, not everyone is J.K. Rowling, but it bears emphasis that 
less than twenty years ago, J.K. Rowling was “everyone,” 
struggling to write and to make a living.  And almost twenty years 
later, the digital tools are available for “everyone” directly to reach 
her audience, and even get paid for her work (assuming that those 
same tools have not made copyright unenforceable).142 
That hopeful forecast notwithstanding, I must also sound a 
somber note.  In the last twenty years we have seen a progressive 
denigration of authors, from the Romantic Author-bashing of the 
 
 138 HARRYPOTTERFANFICTION.COM, http://harrypotterfanfiction.com (last visited Sept. 
5, 2012). 
 139 See Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM J. L. & ARTS 617, 619 (2008). 
 140 See Harry Potter’s New Digital Adventure Begins, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2012, at 
C3. 
 141 See Harry Potter ebooks, PIRATE BAY, http://thepiratebay.se/torrent/7161723/Harry_ 
Potter_ ebooks_ %28Pottermore%29 (ebook uploaded Apr. 5, 2012). 
 142 For example, “fantasy fiction” author Terry Goodkind recently (and so far very 
successfully) began self-publishing digital books.  See Tracking Amazon: Terry 
Goodkind’s Self-Published Novel Skyrockets, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY (July 3, 2012), 
http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/publisher-news/article 
/52860-tracking-amazon-terry-goodkind-s-self-published-novel-skyrockets.html. 
C04_GINSBURG (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2013  3:16 PM 
500 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:465  
1990s143 to the new romances144 of “crowdsourcing,” and of 
authorial altruism (unremunerated authors who just can’t restrain 
themselves from being creative).  More recently, with the advent of 
mass digitization, another attack on authors arrives, this time for 
complicating transactions: if we didn’t have so many pesky authors 
who may be hard to find (or who if found, claim ownership of 
residual digital rights) then we could reduce the friction that 
discourages putting our entire cultural heritage online for the 
broader public good—or at least for the good of the entrepreneurs 
who would profit from new digital exploitations.145 
But this is not a new complaint.  In 1933 Australian novelist 
Miles Franklin imagined a conversation among movie moguls: 
[T]hey were generally agreed that the total 
elimination of the author would be a tremendous 
advance. . . . 
“Authors,” said [the] gentleman, “are the bummest 
lot of cranks I have ever been up against.  Why the 
heck they aren’t content to beat it once they get a 
price for their stuff, gets my goat.” 
. . . . 
There was ready agreement that authors were a 
wanton tax on any industry, whether publishing, 
drama or pictures.146 
 
 143 See, e.g., THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi 
eds., 1994).  The death knell of individual genius continues to sound, as contemporary 
critics contend that the true source of creativity is the author’s surrounding community, to 
which authors owe a debt, whose disregard violates the human rights of the community. 
See also, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity 
Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31 (2011) (contending authors irrationally overvalue their 
work, distorting IP policy). 
 144 See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 
CAL. L REV. 1331, 1332 (2004) (whose title inspired the identification of similar 
“romances”). 
 145 See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Google and the Proper Antitrust 
Scrutiny of Orphan Books, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 411 (2009); see also Authors 
Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 146 MILES FRANKLIN, BRING THE MONKEY 38–39 (1933). 
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In the future, will we continue to perceive authors as a “wanton 
tax,” or as essential contributors to the Constitutional aspiration for 
“the progress of Science”?147 
 
 
 147 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
